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range of experience within an holistic epistemic setting. However, the book 
neglects religious experience within Chinese religious traditions, eastern 
religions more broadly, and non-Christian theistic religions. The Chinese 
subjects introduced are usually converts to Christianity or missionaries 
and, if not, at least invoked when they speak in favour of Christianity—
as are the practitioners of Eastern religions more generally (140, 232, 234, 
218–219, 268, 271). The monism more prevalent in Eastern religions is re-
jected quickly towards the end of Chapter 17. As for Judaism, the case of a 
secular kibbutznik becoming a religious Jew after a mystical experience is 
presented (260–261), but along with the case of Weil’s conversion to Chris-
tianity (259–260). Religious experience within Islam receives a single men-
tion (271).
On a few minor points, the indices are incomplete, and the book in-
cludes quite a few formatting errors, particularly in the offsetting of vari-
ous items in lists or principles (72, 78, 80, 81, 126) and other typographical 
errors, including an error in the header of every other page in Chapter 8.
While advancing the debate about religious experience, Kwan acknowl-
edges that his book will not be conclusive, particularly because of the 
limitations of space provided by a single volume. Skeptical readers will 
likely not be persuaded by this book. This owes in part to the sheer num-
ber of arguments and topics raised (and that then cannot be adequately 
addressed), but also to particular problems with the arguments, some of 
which I have identified in this review. However, to conclude that this is 
not a good book because it is not conclusive would be to commit some-
thing analogous to a super-reliability fallacy. After all, the book is often 
insightful, and even where the arguments do not persuade, they provoke 
much thought. The book will be of interest to philosophy students and 
philosophers of religion, particularly those working on religious experi-
ence and related topics in epistemology.
Inquiring About God: Selected Essays, Volume, 1 by Nicholas Wolterstorff, 
edited by Terence Cuneo. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
313 pages. $85 (hardcover).
Practices of Belief: Selected Essays, Volume 2, by Nicholas Wolterstorff, edited 
by Terence Cuneo. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 435 pag-
es. $85 (hardcover).
R. T. MULLINS, University of St Andrews
As I discussed with some graduate students at my university that I would 
be working on a review of Wolterstorff’s essays, they immediately became 
interested but asked, “When will a collection of his essays on theologi-
cal aesthetics become available?” What this question indicates is the wide 
BOOK REVIEWS 479
breadth of topics that Wolterstorff has worked on over the years. He has hit 
on issues in metaphysics, ethics, philosophy of religion, epistemology, and 
aesthetics. This two-volume collection of essays gives us a good sampling 
of Wolterstorff’s works on philosophy of religion and epistemology. The 
aim of both volumes is to present essays that can represent Wolterstorff’s 
views on a topic without overlapping significantly with other essays in 
the collection. Neither claims to be an exhaustive or systematic treatment 
of Wolterstorff’s thoughts. I wish to highlight a few of the themes through-
out each volume.
Inquiring About God, Volume 1, contains an introduction and thirteen essays 
on philosophy of religion and philosophical theology. Twelve of the essays 
have been previously published in various journals and books over the 
years. Chapter 10, “Is God Disturbed by what Transpires in Human Af-
fairs?” has not been previously published. Throughout this volume, Wolt-
erstorff engages in dialogue with major thinkers such as Kant, Aquinas, 
Augustine, Anselm, and Barth to name but a few. What makes Wolterstorff 
such an important philosopher is the way he engages these thinkers. His 
approach is first to explicate a dialogue partner’s view with careful atten-
tion to her philosophical assumptions well before seeking to critique or 
appropriate her position. “Thou must not sit in judgment until thou hast 
done thy best to understand. Thou must earn thy right to disagree” (302). 
Even though this is primarily a volume on philosophy of religion, one will 
find interesting discussions on epistemology, emotion, philosophy of lan-
guage and interpretation, as well as philosophy of time.
Chapter 1, “Analytic Philosophy of Religion: Retrospect and Pros-
pect,” offers reasons why one should do analytic philosophy of religion. 
The thrust of his answer is not that analytic philosophers seek clarity and 
rigor—though they do seek such things—but instead that the analytic tra-
dition is an important narrative within the history of twentieth-century 
philosophy. Wolterstorff tells the tale of Locke’s epistemology, Russell 
and Moore’s realism overthrowing the popularity of Hegelian idealism, 
as well as the collapse of logical positivism and classical foundational-
ism. The collapse of positivism and classical foundationalism made way 
for analytic philosophy of religion and reformed epistemology (a theme 
discussed at length in Volume 2). Wolterstorff also notes that as analytic 
philosophy of religion has flourished, so has the study of medieval phi-
losophy and theology. Analytic philosophers of religion prefer to have 
conversations with thinkers like Anselm instead of Kant.
Speaking of Kant, chapters 2 and 3 deal explicitly with Kant’s episte-
mology and how it has influenced theology. Chapter 2, “Is It Possible and 
Desirable for Theologians to Recover From Kant?” answers in the affirma-
tive. Part of the Kantian influence on theology and religious studies is the 
notion that one cannot talk about God before she has established that it 
is possible to even talk about God. On Kant’s epistemological scheme, it 
is not possible to experience God. Further, God is outside of the realm to 
which human concepts apply. This puts the theologian in a pickle, to say 
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the least. If God cannot be experienced and our concepts do not apply to 
God, it would seem that it is not possible to talk about God. Farewell to 
theology then, or so it would appear. Wolterstorff offers an in-depth anal-
ysis of Kant’s epistemology and then shows where the weakness in this 
scheme lies. In chapter 3, “Conundrums in Kant’s Rational Religion,” he 
offers further reasons to reject the Kantian scheme by showing that Kant’s 
moral foundation for religion is internally incoherent.
After clearing the Kantian dust from the theological ground, Wolter-
storff begins to move into the realm of philosophical theology by way of 
an engagement with medieval thinkers. Chapter 5, “Divine Simplicity,” 
offers an excellent articulation of divine simplicity set against the back-
drop of medieval ontology. One of the main difficulties that Wolterstorff 
draws out is that it seems to be impossible to predicate anything of a 
simple God. Chapter 7, “God Everlasting,” and chapter 8, “Unqualified 
Divine Temporality,” extend Wolterstorff’s critique of divine simplicity 
and begin his critique of divine impassibility by way of rejecting the doc-
trine of divine timelessness. One of Wolterstorff’s moves is to argue that 
the claims of scripture are prima facie incompatible with a timeless God. 
Nothing in scripture will lead one to think that God is timeless. Instead, 
one must offer good reasons for thinking that God is timeless and then 
offer a plausible way to interpret passages of the Bible that make it appear 
that God is acting in history.
Another move by Wolterstorff is that a timeless God cannot know what 
time it is now, cannot remember the past, nor make plans for the future. 
Within this argument, Wolterstorff is assuming presentism—an ontology 
of time where only the present moment exists—and that in order for God to 
be omniscient He must have some sort of perceptual awareness of what is 
going on in the world. Interestingly, the medievals would only agree with 
Wolterstorff on the first assumption about presentism (e.g., St. Augustine, 
Confessions XI.20. Anselm; Monologion 21, 22, and 24; also, Proslogion 13, 19, 
and 22). They would disagree with him on the second assumption about 
omniscience. As Boethius’s Consolations of Philosophy makes clear, “how 
absurd it is that we should say that the result of temporal affairs is the 
cause of eternal foreknowledge!” (V.147; also see Augustine, On the Trinity 
6.11; and On Genesis 5.18.6). They would hold that God is omniscient by 
having a perfect knowledge of Himself, and in no way is this dependent 
upon the world. It is clear that Wolterstorff would disagree with the medi-
evals over the nature of omniscience.
Wolterstorff’s other main argument against divine timelessness is that 
a timeless God cannot be referred to since God would come to have an 
accidental property, and thus be temporal. We not only can refer to God, 
we do so all the time; thus, God is temporal. The medievals would seem to 
agree with Wolterstorff’s starting point, but would not accept his conclu-
sion. Peter Lombard claims that in referring to God the accidental prop-
erty befalls the creature and not God, thus preserving God’s timelessness 
(Sentences Book I, Dist. VIII, XXX, and XXXIX).
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Chapter 10, “Is God Disturbed by What Transpires in Human Affairs?” 
furthers the critique of impassibility and begins to examine the problem of 
evil. Wolterstorff brings out an internal conflict within Aquinas’s view on 
the matter. Aquinas seems to hold the following three premises. (1) God 
is not disturbed by evil. Not having passions is a perfection. (2) A person 
is morally excellent if she sorrows over an evil. She is morally deficient if 
she does not. (3) God is aware of the evil in the world. It would seem that 
if God is aware of evil and is not disturbed by it, He is morally deficient.
The first volume concludes with chapter 13, “Tertullian’s Enduring 
Question.” Tertullian famously asked what Christian theology should 
do with pagan philosophy and literature. Wolterstorff compares Tertul-
lian’s method with Clement of Alexandria’s approach to philosophy and 
Christian theology. He then seeks to articulate his own answer as to how 
contemporary Christian scholarship should take place. What makes this 
paper a great conclusion to the first volume is that upon reading it one will 
find that Wolterstoff has clearly exemplified this method throughout all of 
the previous essays.
In Practices of Belief, Volume 2, the focus is on epistemology. Like the 
first volume, this collection contains several previously published papers, 
yet many of these have been heavily revised. Of the fifteen essays, five 
are previously unpublished, giving this volume the bragging right to be 
considered the most recent comprehensive statement on reformed epis-
temology. In this volume you will see Wolterstorff interact with thinkers 
like Hilary Putnam, Immanuel Kant, John Locke, Thomas Reid, William 
Alston, Alvin Plantinga, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Roderick Chisholm as 
well as many others.
In chapters 1, “The World Ready-Made,” and 2, “Does the Role of Con-
cepts Make Experiential Access to Ready-Made Reality Impossible?,” 
Wolterstorff sets out to clear the ground of metaphysical anti-realism and 
Kantian skepticism before turning his attention to the concept of entitlement 
in chapters 3 through 5. Chapter 6, “Epistemology of Religion,” begins his 
examination of classical foundationalism, natural theology, the evidential-
ist challenge to religious belief, and reformed epistemology. After this he 
focuses on various ideas within the epistemology of Thomas Reid in chap-
ters 14 and 15. The volume concludes with a delightful postscript where 
Wolterstorff reflects on his life in philosophy. Some of the stories he tells in 
the postscript are entertaining as well as illuminating.
The tale of reformed epistemology (RE) is an interesting and controver-
sial one. RE is in part a rejection of three things: classical foundationalism, 
the evidentialist challenge to religious belief, and the doxastic ideal. The 
evidentialist challenge rests upon classical foundationalism, so part of the 
thrust of RE is to show that classical foundationalism is incoherent. The 
doxastic ideal claims that beliefs should be grounded in acquaintance, or 
logically derived from acquaintance, or based upon probabilistic evidence. 
Locke and other Enlightenment figures argued that this doxastic ideal ap-
plied to everyone and every belief. As Wolterstorff argues, RE follows 
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David Hume and Thomas Reid by rejecting the view that the ideal reflects 
the way human persons actually form beliefs. For instance, many of our 
beliefs are formed on the basis of testimony, and the ideal fails to consider 
this. RE claims that the ideal fails to hold not only for everyday beliefs, but 
also for religious beliefs.
RE is not only a negative project in epistemology. It is not simply the 
rejection of previous ideas. RE seeks to offer a positive account as well. 
Various RE thinkers focus on different epistemological merits, such as 
justification and warrant. Wolterstorff’s work focuses on the merit of en-
titlement as it relates to rationality. Are theists entitled to their religious 
beliefs? Is there some epistemic obligation that they have failed to meet? 
When it comes to discerning if someone is entitled to her belief, one must 
discern if she has fulfilled her epistemic duty. This depends on various 
factors and belief dispositions that a person has. For Wolterstorff, there is 
no doxastic ideal for the ethics of belief that cuts across all persons, places, 
and times. “Obligations to employ practices of inquiry are personally situ-
ated obligations” (111). In employing a practice of inquiry, one must choose 
from among practices that are socially and personally acceptable, as well 
as personally accessible (102–103). As such, whether or not one is entitled 
to her belief is a complex person-situated matter.
Further, we often assess the rationality of our beliefs after we have 
formed them. Part of being entitled to a belief is assessing the beliefs that 
we find ourselves having. Our beliefs are “innocent-until-proven-guilty” 
(257). Being entitled could mean that a person has considered various ar-
guments against her belief and found her belief unscathed. Or it could 
involve her deliberately intervening in the formation of one of her beliefs. 
The only way we can discern if she is rational is by scrutinizing her indi-
vidual belief system and the way she has used her noetic equipment (262).
Both volumes contain valuable discussions for those interested in phi-
losophy of religion, philosophical theology, and epistemology. Each would 
be useful for supplemental reading in a course on philosophy of religion 
or religious epistemology. Volume 2 is especially important for those who 
are researching reformed epistemology. Both volumes are a must have for 
those who are enamored with Wolterstorff’s writings. 
Nature Red in Tooth and Claw: Theism and the Problem of Animal Suffering, by 
Michael Murray. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 206 pages. $70.00 
(cloth).
JOSEPH J. LYNCH, California Polytechnic State University
Michael Murray has written a provocative and challenging work on an is-
sue that is often passed over far too quickly in discussions of the problem 
of evil. In this work he gives the problem of animal suffering the attention 
